Introduction
Human-capital accumulation is expected to be the driving engine of economic growth and development in the 21 st century. The setting of correct incentives for education must therefore rank high on the political agenda. Unfortunately, the economic understanding of optimal education policy is still rather limited. A major reason is that education is a highly complex process, which is affected both by taxation and by potential market failures. This paper focuses on taxation and on the effects it has on the most basic trade-offs in education. As a consequence, the model studied is simple.
Taxpayers have to make a static decision on education, saving, and qualified and nonqualified labour. Such a selection of endogenous choices can be justified as follows. Education raises the productivity of labour, which makes it necessary to differentiate between qualified and nonqualified labour. The model fulfilling such requirements is a straightforward extension of the standard two-period life-cycle model, and the analysis of optimal taxation follows Ramsey's tradition. The paper starts by focussing on a representative taxpayer in Sections 2 and 3. Extensions to heterogeneous taxpayers are derived in Section 4. As a first major result it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from Ramsey's Rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour (Proposition 1). No similar result is known from the Mirrlees approach to the optimal taxation of education. The result holds for arbitrary utility and learning functions. The efficient reduction of nonqualified labour equals that of education and consumption in relative terms. With the General Theory of Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956/57) in mind, one might think it efficient to spread tax distortions uniformly across all feasible margins.
There are, however, particular scenarios where such an inference is unwarranted. As others have shown before, there are well-selected utility functions for which it is second best not to distort saving and it is equally second best not to distort education if the learning function is isoelastic. For the sake of brevity the latter is called the Education Efficiency Proposition. First versions have been proved by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) , and Propositions 2 and 3 are variations designed to clarify the assumptions needed to prove the Proposition. It is shown that the assumptions made by Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) in their latest version for heterogeneous taxpayers can be relaxed in the Ramsey framework (Proposition 3). The most critical assumption needed to prove the Proposition is that the elasticity of learning must be constant across individuals and varying choices of education. This assumption will be defended by referring to the cognitive psychology literature, which provides impressive empirical evidence in favour of such constancy if only the learning program is kept fixed. This phenomenon is known as the Power Law of Learning. The suggested policy implication is to ensure undistorted educational choices within particular learning programs (intensive margin). Whether and when it is optimal to distort the choice between competing learning programs (extensive margin) is a question leading beyond the scope of the present study.
As mentioned, the paper focuses only on the effects taxation has on the basic tradeoffs in education. Such an objective necessitates ignoring various extensions and complications, which have been the subject of scrutiny in the literature. Thus credibility problems of government policy will be ruled out. The possible time inconsistency of education policy is studied by Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996) and Andersson and Konrad (2003) . The return to education will be considered to be certain. Uncertainty is addressed by da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg (2008) . Informational asymmetry and availability of nonlinear tax instruments will be ruled out. The so-called Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation is followed by 1 The importance of such a differentiation has been stressed before by Trostel (1993 Trostel ( , 1996 . Nielsen and Sörensen fail to make it, and this strongly biases their results. See Section 3 below. Differentiation is however not crucial in the Mirrlees approach to the optimal taxation of education. See Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) . Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) , Wigger (2004) , and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) .
Finally, in contrast with Trostel (1993 Trostel ( , 1996 , Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) , Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) , and Richter and Braun (2009) , this paper analyses taxation in a purely static framework.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a representative taxpayer. Section 3 analyses the structure of second-best efficient policy for the representative taxpayer. Section 4 provides extensions to heterogeneous taxpayers.
Section 5 discusses connections to the literature. Section 6 summarizes. Major proofs are relegated to a technical Appendix.
A representative-household model
Consider a representative household living for two periods. Lifetime utility is given by ϕ . The share of first-period income that is spent neither on education nor on consumption is saved:
By way of normalization, the price of consumption is set equal to one. The gross rate of return to saving is denoted by ρ . Second-period consumption is constrained by income earned:
All prices are after taxes and subsidies, and the question is which combination of taxes and subsidies is constrained efficient. The representative household is assumed to maximize utility in 1 2 1 2 , , , , C C L L E subject to the lifetime budget constraint
stated in second-period units. Interpret )
The analysis relies on the dual approach to optimal taxation. This means that the focus is shifted from the household's (indirect) utility function to its (net) expenditure function. The task of minimizing (net) expenditures subject to an exogenous utility constraint is best solved in a two-step approach. At the first step, income derived from education is maximized while keeping 2 L fixed. Let this income be denoted by
, and the optimal amount of education by Hence Y has to be interpreted as quasi-rent income, the source of which is learning and its diminishing return. Note that Y is a monotone increasing, convex function of 2 L :
Let the second-period wage rate before taxes be denoted by 2 w , and the effective social cost of education (i.e., the effective cost before taxes and subsidies) by 1 ( ) p r w f = + . Here r is the gross rate of return to saving before taxes and subsidies, and f is the (unit) cost of education before taxes and subsidies. The choice of education 8 is efficient or not distorted if the tax wedge δ between the marginal social return and the effective social cost,
vanishes. The tax wedge vanishes if, and only if, the rates of return before and after taxes and subsidies are equal:
The taxpayer's expenditure function is defined as 
and e ρ = 1 ω ω ρ ϕ , and u.
As a result, the choice of education reads value so that it is effectively a subsidy. To find out which combination of taxes and subsidies is constrained efficient is the purpose of the analysis. Government's net revenue amounts to
By invoking Hotelling's lemma it can be written as
Second-best efficient policy
The planner's problem is to maximize net revenue (5) 
where the total differentiation operator Δ is defined on arbitrary functions
. (7) According to (7), Δ X equals the weighted sum of the partial derivatives of X with the weights given by the tax wedges. It is an approximation of the total change in X when taxes are chosen efficiently. If it were efficient not to tax the opportunity cost and the monetary cost of education ( 1 1 , w f ω ϕ = = ), then the last term in (6) could be interpreted as a relative change in saving. This is because
By relying on some simple algebraic manipulations and by making use of
where the elasticity '/ EH H η ≡ may well be non-constant in E, (6) can be restated as
As differentiation is additive, (6′) could equivalently be written in the form where the ratio 1 1 / ΔL L is replaced with the ratio
Hence the quantities 1 L . Obviously, efficiency requires reducing qualified labour relatively less than nonqualified labour. The ratio equals 1 − η , and it decreases in η . In other words, the more elastic the individual learning function is, the less should qualified labour be reduced in relative terms. Although this makes good sense, one must note that it fails to agree with Ramsey's Rule of reducing all household choices equiproportionately.
Only the effective labour 2 HL is reduced equiproportionately. As H=H(E) reacts elastically, 2 L is reduced less.
Proposition 1: Second-best efficient policy requires reducing (i) education, consumption, nonqualified non-leisure and labour, and effective qualified labour equiproportionately while reducing
(ii) qualified labour to a lesser degree in accordance with
Proposition 1 raises the question as to which choices of 1 2 , , ϕ ω ω , and ρ (and the associated tax rates) are second best. Clearly, one cannot expect any interesting relationship to hold in full generality. Instead, one has to assume special functions U or H. By varying these assumptions different characterizations of second-best tax rates are obtained. Some of these are more novel than others as compared with standard
Ramsey tax results. An example of little novelty concerns saving. As shown by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Sandmo (1974) , saving should not be taxed if utility is weakly separable in consumption and labour and homothetic in consumption. This result extends to the present framework if U is specified as
some homogeneous function G. See the earlier draft of this paper (Richter, 2008) . In what follows the focus is on characterizations of second-best tax rates that contrast with standard Ramsey results. Two such characterizations are derived. The first one is on education, and the second one is on labour.
On applying the differentiation operator Δ to the first-order condition associated with
By relying on (6′) and substituting for
Obviously, the right-hand side must vanish if ' η =0. 
Hence maximizing efficiency does not require maximizing the social ability rent. In this case, the planner trades off the objective of maximizing the social ability rent against the objective of minimizing the efficiency loss resulting from distorted choices of the utility-generating quantities 1 C , 2 C , 1 L , and 2 L . These two objectives are only separable if (4) holds, i.e. if the right-hand side of (10) vanishes. Compatibility of (10) with (6′) however requires that (4) Combining Propositions 1 and 2 implies that efficient policy well tolerates a reduction in education. This reduction cannot be interpreted, however, as a (conditional) distortion of education. This observation allows one to qualify Trostel (1993) , who stresses the negative effect of proportional income and consumption taxation on education. To make the point clear, consider some proportional tax on labour income and allow monetary costs of education to be tax-deductible. In this case 2 w is reduced in the same proportion as p. As a result, all individual choices of 1 C , 2 C , 1 L , and 2 L will be distorted. Still, the partial efficiency condition (4) holds by construction.
To illustrate the effect of endogenous education on efficient labour taxation, consider the scenario given by
and linear homogeneous G. As mentioned before, the taxpayer's optimization is only well behaved if the concavity of U as a function of 2 L is strong enough to compensate for the convexity of the ability rent Y in 2 L . In terms of (12) (1 )
As 2 ν > /(1 ) η η − is to hold by assumption, the numerator on the right-hand side of (13) is positive. For 0 η = , (13) (1 )
Extensions
Propositions 1 and 2 are clear-cut results, and it is natural to ask whether they continue to hold in more general settings. Two extensions are of particular interest. One allows for endogeneity of factor prices, and the other allows for heterogeneity of taxpayers.
As the former extension implies no surprising result, it will only be sketched.
The claim is that Propositions 1 and 2 go through when prices are endogenous. In fact, it has been shown in the earlier draft of this paper (Richter, 2008) that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold if the second-period factor prices r and 2 w are endogenous.
Two assumptions must however hold. The first one states that the government must be able to issue debt B, so that only the excess of savings over public debt, K=S − B, is a factor of production. The second assumption requires constant returns to scale of production in effective qualified labour 2 HL and capital K. Such constant returns make the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) Production Efficiency Theorem applicable, and it is second best not to distort production but only consumption.
A more interesting extension concerns heterogeneity of taxpayers. As will be shown next, the Education Efficiency Proposition holds even if the planner trades off efficiency against equity and even if the set of policy instruments is incomplete.
However, it must be assumed that the right policy instruments are available and that the elasticity of learning is constant, both in the level of education and across individuals. To be more precise, let 1,.., n N = be the parameter identifying a particular taxpayer. Taxpayers are assumed to differ in preferences and the productivity of learning, but not in the elasticity of learning. Hence
L , etc. be the choices made by n, and let n T denote the taxes paid by n on labour income, savings, and the cost of education as specified by (5). In order to model redistribution, assume that n receives some exogenous income n g financed on the margin by taxing qualified labour income and the cost of education.
Hence ϕ and 2 ω belong to the set of available policy instruments. The planner then maximizes net aggregate tax revenue subject to the constraints that individual budgets are balanced and that welfare W remains constant:
and 1 ( ,.., )
n λ denotes a Lagrange variable. In the Appendix the following result is derived.
Proposition 3: Assuming heterogeneous taxpayers but constancy of the learning elasticity η in , n E , and assuming availability of 2 , ϕ ω , it is optimal not to distort education.
Proposition 3 generalizes a version of the Education Efficiency Proposition for
heterogeneous taxpayers that has been derived before by Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) . The generalization lies in showing that two assumptions on which the analysis of Jacobs and Bovenberg is based can be dropped. One is the availability of a poll tax, and the other is the assumption of identical utility functions.
The assumption that both ϕ and 2 ω are available policy instruments is noteworthy in that it implies that ϕ cannot simply be substituted by 1 ω without affecting efficiency.
This means that it is not irrelevant in the Ramsey framework which kind of educational cost is taxed or subsidized. Subsidizing the monetary cost of education is not equivalent to subsidizing the opportunity cost of forgone earnings, as shown in more detail in the earlier draft of the present paper (Richter, 2008) . A subsidy to the monetary cost of education targets the choice of education without directly affecting utility. This is different with 1 ω . A subsidy to the cost of forgone earnings affects both the choice of education and the choice of non-qualified leisure. The lack of instrumental equivalence of ϕ and 1 ω has to be borne in mind when interpreting results that have been derived in models not allowing one to differentiate between the two costs of education. A case in point is Nielsen and Sörensen (1997) The constancy of the learning elasticity η in , n E is critical for Proposition 3 to hold, and it needs to be commented on. Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) , , , , n u ϕ ω ω ρ subject to (15) and (16) 
The left-hand side of (17) has to be interpreted as a proportional reduction in aggregate compensated demand or supply of X. The right-hand side determines the size of the reduction. The reduction would be the same for all X if the social marginal utility of income n λ were constant across taxpayers. If, however, such constancy fails to hold for reasons of equity, the demands and supplies of taxpayers with high values of n λ are more highly weighted than the demands of other taxpayers, and the reduction of X is adapted accordingly.
Statement (ii) of Proposition 1 extends to heterogeneous taxpayers, with two qualifications. The first one is that the change in aggregate qualified labour is compared with the change in aggregate education. Assuming the latter change to be negative ( n E ¦ <0), (18) holds as stated with ">". The interpretation is that aggregate qualified labour is reduced less than the extended Ramsey rule (17) suggests. The second qualification is that productivity n H enters as a weighting scheme. More precisely, assuming n E ¦ <0, it is shown in the Appendix that the weighted proportional reduction of aggregate qualified labour is less than (17) suggests:
The Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation of education
There have been attempts by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and by Wigger (2004) to characterize optimal incentives for education when adopting the modelling tradition of Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) . The specific feature of this approach is the assumption of asymmetric information. In terms of the present notation it is as if the qualified wage rate 2 ( ) w n and the qualified labour supply 2n L are private and not public information. The planner can only verify the product of the two. In a model with education the question arises whether and to what extent the amount of education should be verifiable. Bovenberg and Jacobs study the scenario when n E is verifiable as well as the scenario when n E is imperfectly verifiable. The following discussion assumes that all individual choices 1 2 1 , , , n n n n C C L E , except that of the qualified labour supply, are verifiable. Full verifiability of n E convinces to the extent that education can be measured by the years spent in institutions of education. Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) demonstrate that it is optimal not to distort education if three assumptions hold:
(i) The planner must be able to levy a nonlinear tax T on qualified labour income and also to subsidize costs of education by some nonlinear scheme S. (ii) Utility functions must be weakly separable in qualified labour and all other individual choice variables. In the present notation this means
(iii) Qualified labour income before tax, 2 Z , must be weakly separable in n and 2 L , on the one hand, and in education E, on the other hand, so that 2 Z can be written as 2 Z ( 2 2 ( , ) w n L ,E).
Given this set of assumptions, it is optimal to equalize marginal rates of taxation and subsidization: T ƍ = Sƍ. As a result, not only education is undistorted, but also saving and nonqualified labour supply. The most direct way of implementing such an optimal tax-transfer system would be the following: (i) Only qualified labour income is taxed.
(ii) Taxpayers are allowed to carry forward costs of education and learning and to deduct them against qualified labour income 2 Z . Notice that not only monetary costs of education should be tax-deductible, but also costs of forgone earnings. See also Trostel (1996 Trostel ( , 1993 , who argues in favour of deductions even exceeding 100%.
da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg (2008) extend the analysis of optimal education policy by incorporating uncertainty. Anderberg sets up a model in which qualified labour income can be written in multiplicative form, 2 Z = 2 2 2 ( , ) w n E L , and in which n takes the role of a productivity shock hitting the representative taxpayer. He demonstrates that education should not be distorted if the elasticity of 2 Z with respect to E is constant in n. The simplest specification ensuring such constancy is
It may be of interest to note that the Education Efficiency Proposition can be derived in both frameworks of Ramsey and Mirrlees but that the required assumptions differ strongly. In particular, constant elasticity of earnings with respect to education is only needed in the Ramsey setting. The explanation is as follows. In the Ramsey approach the planner has two independent efficiency objectives. One is the minimization of distortions in the quantities from which utility is derived. The other objective is the maximization of the quasi-rent income generated by education. These two optimizations are separable, given the linearity constraint on policy instruments, only if the earnings function is isoelastic in education. Separability implies that it is efficient not to distort education and to minimize the distortions in consumption and labour choices. In the cited papers standing in the Mirrlees tradition the planner has only one objective to pursue. This objective is to keep highly productive taxpayers from mimicking less productive taxpayers. For this purpose it suffices to tax qualified labour, as this is the only choice variable for which private information is assumed. As all other individual choices are observable and weakly separable from qualified labour, they should remain undistorted. Conditional efficiency of education can be sustained because the functional specification of subsidization is a priori not constrained and the marginal subsidy to education can therefore be set equal to the marginal tax on qualified labour income.
Summary
Economists are only beginning to understand the optimal setting of tax incentives for education. A major breakthrough is by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) . The present paper contributes to the literature by analysing efficient taxation of education in Ramsey's tradition. It does so by relying on the standard two-period life-cycle model of a representative household with endogenous consumption, labour, and education. A first notable result (Proposition 1) states that Ramsey's Rule does apply to education, consumption, and nonqualified labour but not to qualified labour. Qualified labour supply should be reduced less than the other demands and supplies in relative terms.
No particularly selected utility functions are needed to derive this result. The modelling strategy, however, seems to be critical. At least no similar result has been derived before within the Mirrlees framework of asymmetric information.
The drawback of the Ramsey approach is that efficient reductions of demands and supplies cannot be translated one to one into efficient tax rates. Statements about efficient tax rates are only possible if specific assumptions are made. A well-known example is the familiar Inverse Elasticity Rule. In Section 3 it is shown how this rule has to be adapted if applied to qualified and nonqualified labour. Another example is the result by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and others that saving should not be distorted if utility is separable in consumption and labour and homothetic in consumption. This result directly extends to the present framework with endogenous education. While it depends on the utility function whether saving should be taxed or not, the efficiency of not distorting education only depends on the learning function.
More precisely, it is shown to be efficient not to distort education if the learning function is isoelastic (Proposition 2). This result is called the Education Efficiency Proposition, and Section 4 offers an extension to many heterogeneous taxpayers.
Proposition 3 generalizes earlier versions of the Education Efficiency Proposition derived by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) by adopting the Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation. Two sets of assumptions must hold to prove the present version: (i) It must be possible to tax qualified labour and to tax/subsidize the monetary cost of education. (ii) The learning function must be isoelastic, and the elasticity must be constant across individuals. Implicit is the assumption that education is weakly separable from labour and ability in earning income.
It is natural to ask whether and to what extent the Education Efficiency Proposition
can offer guidance in education policy. Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) express scepticism. They do so by questioning the empirical relevance of weak separability of education from labour and ability in earning income, and even more the relevance of constant elasticity of education. In Section 4 a more positive view is suggested. It is argued that cognitive psychology provides impressive evidence for learning functions the elasticity of which does not vary either in the amount of learning or between individuals. Applicability of this Power Law of Learning is only limited by the observation that the elasticities can differ strongly between different learning programs. The policy conclusion would be that educational choices should at least not be distorted at the intensive margin. Things may be very different at the extensive margin, and not only for the reason that education fails to be weakly separable from labour and ability in earning income or that the planner trades off efficiency against equity. Dynamic complementarities may provide another strong reason to distort educational choices systematically. This point is elaborated by Richter and Braun (2009) . By working with an overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth, they show that it may well be second-best efficient to subsidize education relative to the first-best level even though separability is ensured and even though efficiency is the planner's sole objective. The reason for systematic subsidization is a human-capital investment function displaying a strictly increasing elasticity of education. It is argued that in a dynamic framework such increasing elasticity may be a more appealing assumption than constant elasticity. In view of Remark 2 above it is not surprising to learn that subsidizing human-capital investment is then efficiency enhancing.
Appendix
The proof of (6) 
By Hotelling's lemma and by the definition of the Δ -operator, one obtains
Plugging ( , , ,
The relationship (21) extends to the Δ -notation:
Remark 1 is now easily proved by relying on (22), (6′), and (3): ( , ) G C C is linear homogeneous, it is efficient to set r ρ = .
Optimizing utility in consumption yields It is noted without proof that (25) and (17) 
